From Duty to Dignity
Supporting Service Members in Their Transition to Civilian Life
Executive Summary
Each year, roughly 245,000 service members transition from military to civilian life. While most successfully rejoin their families and communities, more than a quarter of all veterans express difficulties with the transition. Among post-9/11 veterans, a significantly higher proportion—44%—experience readjustment challenges, struggling with housing insecurity, health issues, financial difficulties, and other problems as they turn in their uniforms and begin new roles in civilian society. The Commission has examined the challenges experienced by service members during transition and the adequacy of support provided them by the nation’s defense and veterans agencies. This report outlines the Commission’s findings and three recommendations to ensure more service members transition successfully and avoid contact with the criminal justice system.
Findings and Recommendations
1. Make Transition a Core Mission of the Department of Defense
Finding: The nation’s defense and veterans agencies are not identifying and adequately supporting vulnerable service members as they transition from military to civilian life, leaving many with untreated conditions that increase their risk of criminal behavior and other negative outcomes,
Recommendation: The Department of Defense should make successful transition a core priority mission and ensure this mission is conducted in coordination with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Labor, the Office of Personnel Management, the Small Business Administration, the Department of Education, and state and local public and private veterans agencies and Veteran Service Organizations/Non-Governmental Organizations
2. Integrate Evidence-Based Practices Into Management of Performance Issues and Specified Military Justice Cases
Finding: The military’s punitive approach to performance issues and certain military justice cases stands in stark contrast to best practices in the civilian criminal justice field, where emphasis is placed on providing evidence-based rehabilitative services to individuals with the highest risk and need.
Recommendation: The Department of Defense should integrate evidence-based practices into its management of performance issues and specified military justice cases to promote the retention, treatment, and healing of active-duty and National Guard/Reserve service members.
3. Expand VA Eligibility as Directed by the GI Bill of 1944 and Improve Veterans Services During Transition
Finding: Many service members transitioning out of the military fail to access VA healthcare and other vital services post-discharge, with some declared ineligible due to discharge status or incarceration and others deterred by a complex benefit enrollment process. While there is no direct evidence connecting a lack of VA benefits to justice system involvement, research suggests that veterans without VA care tend to experience poorer health outcomes, particularly those involving PTSD and traumatic brain injuries. Such conditions, if untreated, have been linked to a greater propensity for criminal behavior.
Recommendation: The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) should adopt regulations that follow the plain text of the 1944 GI Bill by providing VA eligibility to all former service members not discharged under dishonorable conditions, and Congress should mandate automated, nationwide enrollment in VA health care for all eligible transitioning service members.
Glossary of Terms
Department of Defense (DoD): An agency of the federal government that provides military forces needed to deter war and ensure the national security of the United States.
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA): An agency of the federal government that provides health, education, disability, financial, and other benefits earned by veterans of the United States Armed Forces.
GI Bill: A 1944 law that provided returning World War II veterans with funds for education, government backing on loans, unemployment assistance, and other benefits.
Military Sexual Trauma (MST): Sexual assault or sexual harassment experienced during military service.
Other than Honorable (OTH): A type of administrative military discharge that results in denial of veterans’ benefits.
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): A mental disorder caused by a traumatic event or multiple events, resulting in the symptoms of intrusive thoughts, avoidance, altered cognition and mood, and altered arousal and reactivity.
SkillBridge: A Department of Defense program designed to support service members at the start of their transition process, through job training and skill development.
Substance Use Disorder (SUD): Continued use of substances, such as drugs, alcohol, or medication, causing a loss of control and physical dependence and impairing the ability to fulfill major obligations at work, school, or home.
Transition Assistance Program (TAP): A joint education program between the Departments of Labor, Defense, Education, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs (VA), the Small Business Administration, and the Office of Personnel Management to provide service members and their families with the information, resources, and tools they need to transition from military to civilian life.
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI): A disruption in the normal functioning of the brain that can be caused by a blow, bump, or jolt to the head, a forceful impact of the head against an object, or the penetration of an object into the skull and brain tissue.
Introduction
“The result is a fragmented and under-resourced system that leaves too many service members ill-prepared for civilian life. This lack of preparation increases their vulnerability to involvement in the criminal justice system.”
Research shows that the challenges veterans face during their transition from military to civilian life can lead to contact with the criminal justice system. The military has made important changes in support of more successful reintegration, including the creation of the Transition Assistance Program (TAP). Despite these efforts, transition is still not treated as a priority by the Department of Defense. The result is a fragmented and under-resourced system that leaves too many service members ill-prepared for civilian life. This lack of preparation increases their vulnerability to involvement in the criminal justice system. Consider the experiences of veterans who have moved through the military in recent years. Many joined the armed forces following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a period when our country experienced the biggest jump in military recruitment since Pearl Harbor.4 These men and women comprise a new generation of veterans, a group that is younger, more racially diverse, and more likely to have experienced trauma prior to their military enlistment,5 all factors associated with an increased likelihood of encountering the criminal justice system.
During their service, this generation of veterans underwent historically high rates of multiple deployments and combat exposure,6 experiences that have been consistently linked to the development of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI).7 As many struggled with the effects of these conditions, the military increasingly turned to prescription drug treatment, as evidenced by the fourfold increase in the prescription of drugs for service members between 2001 and 2009.8 That reliance reflects the military’s shortage of mental health workers, which requires service members to endure long waits for cognitive behavioral therapy and other care. One recent report found that 43% of behavioral healthcare jobs in the Defense Health Agency were vacant as of January 2023. The shift to heavier use of prescription drugs came in tandem with the documented culture of excessive alcohol use within the military.9 Each of these factors–PTSD, TBI, and Substance Use Disorder (SUD)–are linked to poor performance during service and criminal justice involvement after it.10 In recent years, commanders have increasingly relied on other than honorable discharges11 to deal with performance issues, using these discharges to quickly remove service members whom they believe may jeopardize mission readiness.12 Just 1% of World War II veterans received an other than honorable discharge, but 5.8% of post-9/11 service members received the designation, representing more than 100,000 veterans discharged between 2003 and 2013.13
“Each of these factors–PTSD, TBI, and Substance Use Disorder (SUD)–are linked to poor performance during service and criminal justice involvement after it.”
As a result of the rising use of this discharge characterization, a much larger share of post-9/11 veterans start their transition to civilian life without access to health care and other services from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). This denial is in direct conflict with legislation passed by Congress that codified the receipt of VA services for veterans with other than honorable discharges.14 Lacking benefits and care, post-9/11 veterans who received an other than honorable discharge have been found to be at increased risk of homelessness, suicide, and criminal justice system involvement.15 For example, while other than honorable discharges comprise approximately 6% of all discharges, they make up 18% of the discharges held by incarcerated veterans.
“The Commission understands that there is a cost associated with adopting these changes, but we also recognize the high cost of failing to do so.”
While other than honorable discharges are disproportionately represented among justice-involved veterans, those not assigned such a discharge still face a variety of other challenges in their transition out of the military. One reason may be that 70% of recent service members16 start their transition process less than a year before their separation from the armed forces, a timeline deemed too short under the military’s own guidelines.17 In addition, many service members do not attend a class the military offers to ease their return to civilian life. In identifying service members’ readiness for transition, the military classified 41% of all service members who transitioned between April 2021 and March 2022 as not fully prepared.18 Though a classification of “not fully prepared” is supposed to mandate attendance at a two-day class as part of the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), 22% of those identified as the least prepared to transition do not attend this required course.19 Even if they do attend, it is not clear that the program is effective, as TAP lacks a robust evaluation.
Given that many post-9/11 veterans lack VA services and did not receive much formal transitional support, it is not surprising that they are more likely than previous generations to report difficulties with their reentry to civilian life.20 They are also more likely than non-veterans to end up in prison. This sets them apart from previous generations of veterans, who were less likely than their civilian counterparts to become incarcerated.21 In response to these troubling findings, the Council on Criminal Justice Veterans Justice Commission has developed three recommendations designed to improve the transition from military to civilian life, ensure more service members transition successfully, and reduce the number of veterans who land in the criminal justice system.22 Each recommendation is accompanied by a summary of findings as well as a list of detailed actions to guide implementation. To be clear: The Commission understands that there is a cost associated with adopting these changes, but we also recognize the high cost of failing to do so. One estimate puts the cost of violent crime stemming from post-9/11 combat exposure at $26.4 billion.23 Combined with public expenditures associated with veterans’ additional mental and physical health conditions, this figure represents just a sliver of the total costs incurred by federal, state, and local jurisdictions as they contend with the legacy of the military’s insufficient support for the transition phase. As a Commission, we believe Congress and the executive branch must end the failed status quo, codify these recommendations, and engage in strong oversight to ensure these changes serve all future veterans. We stand ready and willing to provide technical assistance to aid this endeavor.
Recommendation One
Make transition a core mission of the Department of Defense
Findings
The Commander’s Dilemma
The military’s insufficient emphasis on transition is manifested in its most crucial form among commanders, or those individuals tasked with leading military operations, organizations, and personnel. In short, supporting transition conflicts with these commanders’ primary and most essential responsibility—maintaining mission readiness. When service members are valuable contributors to their units, the need to keep them on duty can seem of greater importance to a commander than the service member’s post-military future. One example of this dilemma relates to service members’ participation in a Department of Defense (DoD) program such as SkillBridge, which provides participants with work experience through job training, internships, or apprenticeships.25 Participation in SkillBridge often requires a service member to spend 180 days away from the unit without a replacement. Some service members report26 that commanders deny SkillBridge requests because of the importance of maintaining mission readiness, although data documenting reasons for such denials has not been systematically collected. A recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO)27 found that service members face similar barriers when seeking access to the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), which may explain why so few complete this required program on time. Low Prioritization
The federal government’s current allocation of resources exemplifies the lack of emphasis placed on transition. While the DoD has budgeted more than $2 billion for recruitment for 2024, just $160 million was dedicated to TAP,28 the DoD’s program to help service members reenter civilian life. This imbalance underscores a problematic "recruit and replace" model29 that has persisted in the military for decades, and the repercussions ripple across the country. Specifically, states and cities bear the costs associated with poorly managed transitions, such as untreated mental health issues, substance abuse, and criminal behavior. One study estimates a $26.4-billion cumulative price tag just for violent crime resulting from post-9/11 combat exposure.30 Jeopardizing Recruitment and National Security
The inadequate support for transition has immediate consequences for individual service members, such as high rates of suicide in the first year following transition.31 It also poses a long-term threat to the military's recruitment strategy. This is no small matter given the nation's current recruitment struggles, which have led to the smallest U.S. military force in more than 80 years.32 Over the last three years, the total number of service members has dropped by 64,000, down to 1,284,500, and lawmakers have blamed the reduction not on decreasing threats to national security, but on the growing difficulty of persuading young people to enlist. This decline in the size of the military makes a robust transition support system a strategic and national security necessity as well as an imperative for service members and their families and communities. When service members experience a seamless transition into civilian life, they are more likely to speak positively about their military experience,33 becoming hometown recruiters for the armed forces and influential advocates for service. By contrast, the current dearth of effective transition programs helps perpetuate a disheartening trend, with veterans increasingly less inclined to encourage others within their networks to enlist.34 A survey conducted in 2021 documented this waning enthusiasm, finding that 63% of service members, veterans, retirees, and dependents would recommend military life to someone considering it, down from 75% in 2019.35 By investing in and prioritizing transition support, the military can reverse this negative trajectory and foster a culture that makes veterans eager to actively promote military service as a viable and fulfilling career option. Such a reversal is essential to boost military recruitment numbers and ensure the reliable defense of our national security. Disciplinary Issues Stemming from Service-Related Injuries
Since World War II, the fivefold increase in those receiving other than honorable discharges suggests that commanders are increasingly using these discharges to handle troops who are not performing to standard or who have disciplinary issues. Research has shown36 that a disproportionate share of service members with other than honorable discharges have experienced military sexual trauma (MST) and/or suffer from PTSD or other mental health conditions,37 traumatic brain injury (TBI), and substance use disorder (SUD), which may explain their poor performance. For example, one study of 443,000 veterans who deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan found that 45% of those discharged for misconduct were diagnosed with at least one mental health condition or SUD, compared to 20% of those discharged under routine conditions.38
The proportion of veterans receiving an other than honorable discharge has increased fivefold since World War II.
Veterans with other than honorable discharges make up approximately 6% of all discharges . . .
but 18% of all incarcerated veterans.
Veterans with other than honorable discharges are three times more likely to be at risk of suicide than veterans with honorable discharges.
While the evidence clearly shows that commanders are increasingly turning to these discharges, it is not clear that they understand the consequences of doing so. Most importantly, these discharges result in a lifetime denial of essential VA care and benefits. Of the 122,000 service members separated for misconduct between 2001 and 2013, 117,000 were not recognized by the VA (and thus, were excluded from VA care and other benefits) because of their discharge characterization.39 While this denial of benefits is likely intended to deter misbehavior, it also creates a paradox, wherein many of the veterans who are suffering from the invisible wounds of war and are most in need of targeted assistance are those least likely to receive it. Exemplifying this issue, recent evidence has found that service members are experiencing brain injuries due to exposure to blasts from their own weapons,40 and then are frequently denied health benefits due to substance use, aggression, or other behavior stemming from these injuries. The results are alarming. Research shows that veterans with other than honorable discharges are three times more likely to be at risk of suicide41 than veterans who receive honorable discharges. Similarly, veterans with other than honorable discharges face elevated rates of homelessness and incarceration.42
Fragmented Leadership
There is no single primary entity or person accountable for the effectiveness of transition efforts. Several federal agencies have responsibilities for transition, including the DoD, VA, Department of Labor, Small Business Administration, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Education. However, the absence of a sole responsible entity to coordinate transition creates problems. While recent efforts have improved communication between agencies, those tasked with transition often fail to collaborate; as a result, some transitioning service members fail to receive mental health treatment and suicide prevention resources.43 Executive Order 13822, issued in 2018,44 called on the DoD, VA, and Department of Homeland Security to create a joint action plan to provide seamless access to treatment and services to address this issue. But an evaluation45 of this plan in 2021 revealed ongoing challenges. These are perhaps best illustrated by the persistently high suicide rate among veterans, with an estimated 1746 to 2447 dying by suicide each day, a value that varies based on how service members are defined.
TAP Issues and the Lack of a Proper Risk Assessment Model
The decentralized approach to transition is also reflected in TAP, the DoD’s primary program to help service members reenter civilian life. In a recent change to TAP, all service members are now evaluated for their level of preparedness for transition at the beginning of the program.48 While this move to identify service members at greatest risk of failing in transition is commendable, the large number of entities responsible for managing the transition process remains a problem. In particular, each service branch is responsible for assessing transition preparedness, which has resulted in varying procedures and the inconsistent identification49 of those most at risk. In addition, the military’s response for those service members identified as being at the greatest risk is to require attendance at a two-day course to address their needs. Even if that requirement were a sufficient response, data indicate that more than one in five at-risk service members do not complete the course, and the military provides no additional interventions or services. This process deviates substantially from the principles underlying evidence-based risk assessments,50 which emphasize the consistent identification of those most at risk. Moreover, the different identification methods across the branches do not appear to draw on known risk factors for poor outcomes in civilian life, such as PTSD, TBI, MST, SUD, and other behavioral health conditions.51 Notably, information on the presence of such factors is collected by the DoD, meaning that the department has the necessary data to create and validate a risk-need assessment tool capable of identifying the service members most at risk of facing challenges in transition (e.g., suicide, criminal justice involvement). In short, the DoD has the tools and data to implement an evidence-based risk assessment among transitioning service members to identify those most at-risk and connect those individuals to services designed to effectively meet their needs, but is not doing so.
Failure to Coordinate with On-the-Ground Entities
Non-governmental organizations and state and local governments attempt to fill gaps in transition services but generally lack the necessary resources, expertise, and data to evaluate their effectiveness. State Departments of Veterans Affairs and local government offices offer transition assistance, but these efforts vary widely in services provided and whether those services are based on evidence or even evaluated. Similarly, because of a lack of coordination between federal agencies and these state and local entities, communities are unable to identify transitioning veterans and provide needed programs and services.52 Local non-profit organizations that assist in transition face similar challenges. These organizations tailor programs and services to the needs of the veterans in their communities. While this work has led to the development of promising and innovative smaller-scale programs, these programs may not be relevant to transitioning veterans in other communities. Additionally, many organizations lack the funding to conduct pilot programs, feasibility studies, or rigorous evaluations to identify the core program components that are effective and could be replicated in other communities.
Recommendation
The Department of Defense should make successful transition a core priority mission and ensure this mission is conducted in coordination with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Labor, the Office of Personnel Management, the Small Business Administration, the Department of Education, and state and local public and private veterans agencies and Veteran Service Organizations/Non-Governmental Organizations.
Implementation Steps
1
Congress and the President should establish an Under Secretary of Defense for Transition, mitigating the issue of fragmented delivery of services and creating accountability in one office.
a. Enhancing the coordination of information, data, and best practices between and among programs serving justice-involved veterans.
b. Identifying research gaps in veterans’ programs.
c. Funding original research and technical assistance to fill those gaps and encouraging programmatic innovation to expand evidence-based practice for justice-involved veteran interventions.
2
Congress should mandate that the DoD, through this new Under Secretary, create, validate, and implement a validated risk-needs assessment that identifies service members at highest risk for post-transition problems associated with criminal justice system involvement (e.g., the risk of suicide, homelessness, SUD, or mental health disorders).
a. This risk-needs assessment should be based on standardized data and processes and follow established evidence-based practices for the development, validation, and implementation of risk-need assessments.53
i. Where possible, these assessments should rely on automated processes and objective data, ensuring greater consistency and efficiency in the identification of at-risk service members.54
b. These risk-needs assessments should be completed for all service members voluntarily leaving military service 180 days prior to their scheduled transition date. (See (3)(j) for the transition process needed for service members undergoing an involuntary separation.)
3
Congress should mandate that the DoD establish regional Joint Transition Centers in the contiguous United States to ensure adequate time and resources are provided to transitioning service members.55 These residential centers should employ highly trained personnel, preferably located near VA resources. This will alleviate the inconsistencies in programming and delivery of service and provide efficiencies in scale and distribution of resources. Further, Joint Transition Centers should make use of the best-known online tools for programming and telehealth, along with support for housing and employment.
a. Senior officials from DoD, VA, and DOL should be on the staff of each Joint Transition Center, ensuring significant effort and support from each department.56
b. The utilization of the Joint Transition Centers by service members should be based on the results of their risk-needs assessment described above. At 90 days before transition:
i. Those identified as low risk should remain in their current station, complete an online transition course through the Joint Transition Centers, and be connected to evidence-based Veterans Service Organizations/Non-Governmental Organizations, such as Onward Ops, VECTR or the REBOOT Workshop, to help prepare them for transition.57
ii. Those identified as medium risk should be transferred to a Joint Transition Center or complete transition in their assigned unit with individualized assistance, care, and coordination through the Joint Transition Center.
iii. Those identified as high risk should be transferred to a Joint Transition Center to complete their transition.
c. Service members who are transferred to a Joint Transition Center should be moved to a temporary status in accordance with the rules of their military branch and placed in the temporary roster of their branch.58
i. This personnel reform is intended to ensure the mitigation of the commander’s dilemma and must be implemented in this manner, for that purpose.
d. Service members facing general or special court-martial proceedings should remain under the command and authority of the convening authority and not be transferred to a Joint Transition Center. If there is a conviction, any transition programming following the court-martial proceeding should be provided only when appropriate under circumstances determined at the discretion of the military judge. If there is no conviction but there is a subsequent administrative separation, the appropriate commander should retain discretion.
i. Prior to the referral of charges to a general or special court-martial, each service member should be evaluated by a mental health professional to determine if evidence-based practices, as listed below in Recommendation 2, could result in treatment and retraining, unless it is waived in writing by the service member after consultation with defense counsel.
e. When service members are transferred to a Joint Transition Center, sole authority to determine the daily duties of the service members should be assumed by Joint Transition Center officials, rather than remaining with the service member’s prior commander. (This removes the conflict involving commander’s dual responsibilities for maintaining mission-readiness and supporting transition.)
i. Responsibility for discharge status should similarly move to Joint Transition Center officials, though input from the prior commander should be considered.
ii. Responsibility for SkillBridge and similar transition programs and requests should similarly be moved to Joint Transition Center officials, though input from the sending commander should be considered.
f. Joint Transition Centers should coordinate specialized diagnostics and evidence-based cognitive behavioral therapy, medical treatment, mental health care, and substance use disorder treatment with other facilities.
i. When possible, Joint Transition Centers should be located near existing entities that provide evidence-based healthcare for veterans, such as Cohen Veteran Network clinics59 or VA hospitals.
ii. The scope of the VA should be revised to allow the VA to assist in the transition care plan for these service members.
iii. Joint Transition Centers should have the authority to extend a service member’s time at the center to allow for appropriate programs (e.g., SkillBridge) and treatment.
iv. When health professionals deem it appropriate for a service member’s care, family members should be involved in the treatment, including through mechanisms such as telehealth.
g. Joint Transition Centers should develop an individualized case plan for each service member based on the results of the member’s risk-needs assessment and should offer evidence-based programs designed to address their specific risks and needs.
i. The goal of a service member’s time at the Joint Transition Center should be the completion of this individualized case plan.
ii. Joint Transition Centers should develop public-private partnerships with NGOs offering transition services, such as Onward Ops, VECTR, or the REBOOT Workshop, to develop the case plans and provide evidence-based programming.
(1) Such partnerships should rely on evidence-based programs with a record of effectiveness; alternatively, the NGO should permit evaluation of the programs’ effectiveness.
h. Joint Transition Centers should validate the location where the service member intends to live after discharge and ensure electronic transfer of information to state and local public VSOs.
i. Joint Transition Centers should work with state and local public VSOs to create appropriate memorandums of understanding to allow for this electronic transfer of information.
(1) Service members should be allowed to opt out of this electronic transfer of their information to state and local VSOs.
ii. When possible, transitioning service members should be placed in a Joint Transition Center that is as close as possible to where they intend to live after discharge, reducing the number of distant relocations.
i. DoD should target service members at Joint Transition Centers for intra-branch, cross-branch, Reserve, and National Guard retention, as some individuals may wish to continue serving the nation and the services may favor their reenlistment.
j. All service members given an involuntary separation (e.g., medical, misconduct, or administrative) should transfer to a Joint Transition Center 90 days before their separation date.
i. At the Joint Transition Center, these service members should undergo evidence-based medical and mental health screening and treatment, as well as evidence-based programming, with the goal of potentially continuing their service following program completion.
k. When possible, Joint Transition Centers should repurpose existing facilities, including the use of closed public and private facilities.
l. Congress should provide funds to promote Joint Transition Center success:
i. This should include grants for NGOs working with Joint Transition Centers to promote the use of evidence-based practices, innovation, and evaluation.
ii. Funding should also be provided to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the Joint Transition Center process.
iii. Relevant federal agencies should collaborate with the Joint Transition Centers to identify appropriate programs and evaluation criteria.
m. To ensure the reforms identified above become part of federal policy and withstand agency leadership changes:
i. Congress should include these reforms in the United States Code.
ii. Congress should give DoD broad statutory authority to implement these reforms and ensure accountability for cooperation and performance by all associated federal agencies.
n. Congress should employ oversight powers to ensure that the DoD complies with these new provisions.
Recommendation Two
Integrate evidence-based practices into management of performance issues and specified military justice cases
Findings
When service members fall short of performance standards, commanders find themselves with limited options to address problematic behavior; many resolve this dilemma by turning to the military justice system or administrative separations. While commanders must be able to maintain order and discipline to accomplish their assigned missions, this approach emphasizes punishment and swift removal and leaves little room for rehabilitation and retention. Indeed, one result of the military justice and administrative separation processes is that veterans can be denied care for an injury that was sustained in service of their country and caused the misconduct that led to their removal. These dynamics potentially endanger the life of the service member, put the service member’s family and community at risk, and increase the likelihood of criminal justice system contact. This use of punitive measures is particularly problematic because individuals failing to meet performance standards are disproportionately more likely to be suffering from the invisible wounds of war, including conditions such as PTSD, TBI, SUD, MST, and mental health challenges.60 As noted earlier, this issue has been highlighted recently by evidence of service members experiencing brain injuries due to exposure to blasts from their own weapons,61 and subsequently being denied health benefits due to behavior stemming from these injuries, such as increased levels of violence and aggression. While direct causal evidence linking a lack of VA care and benefits to justice system engagement has not been established, compelling reasons suggest a correlation. Research indicates that veterans without VA care tend to experience poorer health outcomes, particularly in the treatment of conditions that disproportionately affect veterans, such as PTSD, TBI, and MST.62 Given the heightened likelihood of multiple deployments, combat exposure, and associated injuries like PTSD, TBI, and MST in the post-9/11 generation of veterans, the absence of robust care increases the risk of insufficient treatment for these conditions,63 leading, in turn, to an increased risk of violent and criminal behavior.64 Veterans lacking VA care and benefits also are more likely to face financial insecurity,65 a factor that has been linked to a greater propensity for criminal behavior.66
Compounding these challenges are cultural issues within the military, such as a prevalent culture of excessive alcohol use67 and an increasing reliance on prescription medication in the absence of sufficient behavioral health care resources.68 These factors contribute to a complex web of challenges that affect the mental and physical well-being of service members and may lead to performance issues that are currently handled through the military justice system or administrative separations. In addition, evidence suggests that the military justice system and administrative separations69 disproportionately affect lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer service members, as well as service members of color, leading to the lifetime denial of VA benefits and services to these veterans.70 The use of punitive measures can lead to multiple poor outcomes. Evidence shows that veterans who receive other than honorable discharges are three times more likely than those without such a discharge designation to be at risk of suicide.71 Moreover, while only 6% of all veterans receive an other than honorable discharge, roughly 18% of incarcerated veterans are assigned this discharge characterization.72 Similarly, veterans with less than honorable discharges are more likely to experience homelessness and a range of behavioral and mental health challenges, issues of particular concern today given the 7% rise in the number of homeless veterans seen in the U.S. from 2022 to 2023.73 A recent book on the invisible wounds of war74 describes one impact of these challenges as a “military misconduct Catch-22”, wherein “it is simply too late to obtain treatment for military offenders with ongoing mental health needs because military offenders are too far along the pathway to punitive or administrative separation.” Furthermore, the application of punitive measures means the military is discharging thousands of service members annually at a time when maintaining adequate force levels is a significant challenge, with the total number of service members recently dropping to its lowest level in 80 years.75
The military’s current punitive approach stands in stark contrast to best practices in the civilian criminal justice field, where emphasis is placed on providing evidence-based rehabilitative services to individuals with the highest risk and need.76 These evidence-based practices recognize that such an approach provides the greatest economic and public safety benefits, preventing individuals from cycling in and out of the criminal justice system due to unaddressed issues that drive criminal behavior, and reducing the costs associated with this behavior.77 For example, the current 4,000 treatment courts in operation serve more than 150,000 people each year, leading to a 58% reduction while saving taxpayers $6,000 per treatment court participant.78 By integrating evidence-based practices into its management of service members with behavior and performance issues, the military can support the well-being of individuals who have served their country, reduce the number of veterans who land in the criminal justice system, increase retention, and improve the strength and readiness of its overall force.
Recommendation
The Department of Defense should integrate evidence-based practices into its management of performance issues and specified military justice cases to promote the retention, treatment, and healing of active-duty and National Guard/Reserve service members.79
Implementation Steps
1
In eligible military justice cases, prior to the referral of charges to a general or special court-martial, each service member should be evaluated by healthcare professionals to determine whether evidence-based interventions could result in treatment and retraining, unless it is waived in writing by the service member after consultation with defense counsel.
a. Commanders or prosecutors should retain discretion over referral to a court-martial, but consideration should be given to amenability to treatment and the availability of evidence-based resources.
b. Eligible military justice cases should involve offenses that would normally be probation eligible in the civilian sector.
2
Congress should require the Department of Defense to identify and enable the use of evidence-based practices for eligible disciplinary and performance issues, allowing operational force commanders to rehabilitate and retain service members who are on active-duty or in National Guard/Reserve units.
a. These practices should be consistent with evidence-based civilian accountability court practices (e.g. drug courts), such as the use of case planning, treatment, and supervision.80
i. Eligibility criteria for this intervention should similarly be established in accordance with evidence-based civilian accountability court practices.81
ii. The military should create these court systems and/or should allow for partnerships with existing civilian accountability courts to operate these programs.
b. When a service member successfully completes a program, they should be allowed to return to service.82
3
Congress should fund a study to explore whether administrative separations and military justice are used disproportionately across the dimensions of race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation.
4
Congress should employ oversight powers to ensure that the DoD complies with these new provisions.
Recommendation Three
Expand VA eligibility as directed by the GI Bill of 1944 and improve veterans services during transition
Findings
Many service members undergoing transition face significant challenges in accessing vital VA services post-discharge. Statistics show that just 44% of veterans are enrolled in health care provided by the VA,83 indicating a substantial gap in service utilization. Multiple factors may explain this gap, from ineligibility for care because of discharge characterization or incarceration to a personal preference for another source of care (e.g., private health insurance). One key barrier to VA services is the absence of automated and immediate enrollment into care and benefits following transition, forcing service members to engage in a complex process to obtain care. The lack of a streamlined enrollment process creates a gap in care for service members as they leave active duty and reenter civilian life. While discontinuity of care undermines outcomes across populations,84 it is of particular concern for service members during the initial year post-transition, when they are at a uniquely high risk for suicide.85 Addressing this gap in enrollment is imperative to ensure transitioning veterans receive uninterrupted support during this vulnerable period. Incomplete Electronic Health Modernization
The discontinuity of care during transition has been exacerbated by difficulties in updating the systems for veterans’ health records. The National Defense Authorization Act, passed by Congress and implemented in 2008, directed the DoD and VA to jointly develop and roll out a common electronic health record system to connect VA medical facilities with the DoD, the U.S. Coast Guard, and participating community care providers. The goal was to allow clinicians to easily access a veteran’s full medical history in one location, recognizing that the accuracy and portability of service members’ health records from DoD to VA facilities is critical to facilitating consistent, quality health care and support throughout a veteran’s transition to civilian life.86 Unfortunately, this effort, known as the Electronic Health Record Modernization,87 has been unsuccessful, with the VA announcing in April 2023 that it was halting additional rollouts of its electronic health records.88 As a result, VA providers may still face difficulties in accessing the full health history of veterans, making continuity of care a challenge. Lack of Alignment With 1944 GI Bill of Rights
Another impediment to support is the denial of VA services based on discharge status, a practice at odds with the legislative framework governing VA eligibility.89 In the 1944 G.I. Bill of Rights, Congress explicitly wrote that individuals who were not discharged under dishonorable conditions90 should be eligible for VA care and benefits. However, the VA's implementation has not aligned with this plain text, resulting in the unlawful denial of services to hundreds of thousands of veterans with other than honorable discharges. As noted above, individuals receiving other than honorable discharges are disproportionately represented among justice-involved veterans, making up 6% of all discharges but 18% of all incarcerated veterans.91
In 2015, a group of legal experts petitioned the VA to align its eligibility requirements with the GI Bill’s language.92 Despite pointing out the urgency of the issue by noting that the VA’s interpretation of the law meant it was excluding more veterans from VA benefits than at any time in U.S. history, the petitioners have yet to receive a final rule in response. While the VA has taken some actions, such as seeking more public comments on the rule, the petition remains without a final response more than eight years after it was submitted. As noted earlier, while direct causal evidence linking a lack of VA care and benefits to justice system engagement is not established, research indicates that veterans without such care tend to experience poorer health outcomes,93 particularly those involving conditions that disproportionately affect veterans (e.g., PTSD, TBI, and MST). Given the heightened likelihood of multiple deployments, combat exposure, and associated injuries like PTSD, TBI, and MST in the post-9/11 generation of veterans, the absence of robust care increases the risk that these conditions will not be sufficiently treated,94 therefore leading to an elevated likelihood of violent and criminal behavior.95 Additionally, veterans lacking VA care and benefits are more likely to face financial insecurity,96 a factor that has been linked to a greater propensity for criminal behavior.97 These findings underscore the urgent need to address the barriers preventing transitioning service members from accessing essential VA services. Failure to do so undermines the well-being of veterans and poses risks to public safety.
Recommendation
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) should adopt regulations that follow the plain text of the 1944 GI Bill by providing VA eligibility to all former service members not discharged under dishonorable conditions, and Congress should mandate automated, nationwide enrollment in VA health care for all eligible transitioning service members.
Implementation Steps
1
The President should direct the VA to revise existing regulations and extend benefits eligibility to all the veterans that Congress intended the VA to serve, which includes all former service members with administrative separations (including with an other than honorable discharge) and those separated with a bad conduct discharge from a special court-martial.98
a. Congress and the President should provide oversight to ensure that the VA complies with these new regulations in a manner consistent with the congressional language in the 1944 GI Bill.
2
Congress should mandate automated, nationwide enrollment in VA health care for all transitioning service members. This process should begin prior to discharge, allowing for continuity of care once a transitioning service member exits the force.
a. VA health care should be automatically provided to all veterans during the first two years following their discharge, ensuring continuity of care during this particularly vulnerable time in a veteran’s life. Veterans should be permitted to opt out of this enrollment.
3
Congress should continue to oversee the Electronic Health Record Modernization process and hold leaders accountable at the Federal Electronic Health Record Modernization Program Office, VA, and DoD to ensure expeditious completion.
a. Service members should be allowed to opt out of having their DoD medical records shared with the VA at the time of their discharge.
b. Congress should fund longitudinal research that draws on this new electronic data sharing to track service members through the transition process and evaluate the effectiveness of transition services in preventing criminal justice system involvement.
4
The Congressional Budget Office or Government Accountability Office should prepare a report on congressional appropriations and actual expenditures for research on PTSD in the military from 2000 to the present, along with any results obtained from this research.
Conclusion
The Commission’s findings and recommendations reflect the urgent need for the Department of Defense to prioritize a targeted set of measures that address the transition of service members to civilian life. The challenges facing transitioning service members–ranging from financial insecurity to PTSD, SUD, and an array of mental health issues–highlight the inadequacies of the current fragmented and under-resourced system and the resulting risks to the health and safety of veterans, their families, and their communities. The establishment of an Undersecretary of Defense dedicated to transition, coupled with evidence-based risk assessments and Joint Transition Centers, offers a strategic framework that would allow the military to address these challenges comprehensively. Additionally, adopting evidence-based practices that prioritize rehabilitation and retention would help the military reduce the number of justice-involved veterans and enhance overall force readiness. Lastly, ensuring automated, nationwide enrollment in VA care for transitioning service members, and aligning benefit eligibility with the language of the 1944 GI Bill, can reduce disruptions in care and mitigate the heightened risks of suicide, homelessness, and criminal behavior among newly discharged veterans. Taken together, these recommendations create a more proactive and coordinated effort that honors the commitment of those who have served our country and contributes to a safer society. These actions also will save lives and economic resources in communities across the country, as service members avoid the health complications and criminal behavior associated with failed transitions. Upon request, we stand by to assist Congress in putting these proposals into action. This is the second set of recommendations from the Commission, following the previous report on assisting veterans in the front end of the criminal justice system.99 Next, we turn to veterans who are incarcerated and are being released and reentering communities. Drawing upon research and expertise from correctional leaders, formerly incarcerated veterans, and military officials, the Commission will develop findings and policy recommendations to better support these veterans and ensure that they reenter their communities prepared to succeed as productive members of society.
Cost Estimates
This document offers an estimate for costs related to various aspects of the Veterans Justice Commission’s transition recommendations. Two important caveats should be considered along with these estimates. First, the figures below are designed to reflect a rough estimate of possible costs and should not be seen as exact projections. The estimates were developed through conversations with military and criminal justice experts and generally involved the identification of expenses that are analogous to the recommendations offered by the Commission. Second, these costs should be weighed against the benefits that might come from reducing the challenges faced by service members in their transition to civilian life. For example, studies investigating post-9/11 veterans suggest that violent crime among this generation of former service members has led to tens of billions of dollars in costs. The estimates below do not provide any estimated savings that would result from the implementation of the recommendations, but such benefits should be kept in mind when evaluating the cost of the Commission proposals.
Recommendation One
A. Congress and the President should establish an Under Secretary of Defense with leading responsibility for transition.
Estimated cost: $7.9 million
Source: According to a memo to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the 2024 projected cost for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs is $7.9 million. This office serves a similar role to the one outlined for an Under Secretary of Defense in charge of transition.
B. Congress should mandate that the DoD, through this new Under Secretary, create, validate, and implement an objective risk-needs assessment that identifies service members at the highest risk for post-transition problems associated with criminal justice system involvement
Estimated cost: $200,000 to $500,000
Source: This estimate is based on testimony from Dr. Zachary Hamilton about risk assessment tools built in criminal justice settings. Dr. Hamilton is an expert on innovation in risk and needs assessments. He serves as the Associate Director of the Nebraska Center for Justice Research at the University of Nebraska Omaha.
C. Congress should mandate that the DoD establish regional Joint Transition Centers (JTCs) in the contiguous United States to ensure adequate time and resources are provided to transitioning service members.
Estimated cost: Unknown
Source: While the cost of the JTCs is unknown, we assume that these would operate in a manner similar to the Army’s Recovery Care Programs100 (formerly known as Warrior Care and Transition Programs). The budget for those programs is unknown, but if discovered, we believe that budget would serve as a useful starting point for estimating the cost of the JTCs.
Recommendation Two
A. Enable the use of evidence-based practices for disciplinary and performance issues, allowing for operational force commanders to rehabilitate and retain service members who are on active duty or in National Guard/Reserve units.
Estimated cost: Unknown
Source: The only analogous practice currently in operation is run by Judge Jeffrey Manske at Fort Cavazos.101 According to testimony delivered to the Commission by Judge Manske, that operation does not incur any cost to the Department of Defense, but instead is supported by funding outside of the military. Similar coordination with local entities could be replicated in establishing the programs and procedures outlined in this recommendation, but at this point, the prospects for doing so are unclear. Thus, providing a cost estimate is not possible at this point.
B. Congress should fund a study to identify the potentially disproportionate use of administrative separations and military justice across the dimensions of race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation.
Estimated cost: $300,000 to $600,000
Source: This projection reflects testimony from Dr. Andrea Finlay, an expert on justice-involved veterans and the recipient of multiple large research grants. Dr. Finlay pointed to the costs of similar government-funded studies102 that have been aimed at understanding and reducing disparities.
Recommendation Three
A. The President should direct the VA to revise existing regulations to extend benefits eligibility to all the veterans that Congress intended the VA to serve, a group that includes all former service members with administrative separations (including with an other than honorable discharge) and those separated with a bad conduct discharge from a special court-martial.
Estimated cost: $45.5 million annually
Source: A VA Waiver Request on Executive Order 13893 that called for administrative separations to generally be considered honorable estimated that such a change would cost approximately $455.6 million over 10 years.
B. Congress should mandate automated, nationwide enrollment in VA health care for all transitioning service members during the first two years following their discharge.
Estimated cost: $4.04 billion annually
Source: According to the Congressional Budget Office, the VA spends an average of $14,750 per patient.103 With 245,000 service members transitioning each year, the VA costs for each cohort would total $3.6 billion. However, approximately 44% of those service members would enroll in VA care without this provision, suggesting the additional cost would actually be $2.02 billion per cohort. With this recommendation mandating two years of care (i.e., two cohorts), the annual cost estimate totals $4.04 billion.
C. Congress should fund longitudinal research that draws on this new data-sharing to track service members through the transition process in order to evaluate the effectiveness of transition services in preventing criminal justice system involvement.
Estimated cost: $450,000 to $1.5 million
Source: This projection is based on testimony from Dr. Andrea Finlay, an expert on justice-involved veterans and the recipient of multiple large research grants. Dr. Finlay pointed to the costs of similar government-funded longitudinal studies focused on veterans.104
Suggested Citation: Council on Criminal Justice. (2024). From duty to dignity: Supporting service members in their transition to civilian life. https://counciloncj.foleon.com/veterans-commission/vjc-reports/transition