In debates surrounding police reform, the term “bad apple” features prominently. The argument that ridding agencies of a few wrongdoers will cure all that ails American policing is overly simplistic, failing to recognize the role that organizational culture and accountability mechanisms play. Nonetheless, the current patchwork of decertification policies across the country is alarming, allowing officers who engage in misconduct and violate the law to move down the road and pin on a new badge with impunity. Those who do are likely to cause more harm. Most states have a process for revoking police officers’ certification when they are convicted of felonies or certain misdemeanors, or commit other forms of egregious or repeated misconduct. But far too often such officers remain on the job even after they have participated in misconduct that qualifies them for decertification. The explanation lies in the variations in decertification regimes by state and the absence of a comprehensive national decertification database that includes all decertified officers. For example, all but one of the 46 state agencies with authority to decertify officers can or must do so for felony convictions, but about half require officers to be convicted of a crime before they are eligible for decertification. Most states can decertify officers for misdemeanor convictions (78%) and failure to meet training requirements (69%), while a smaller proportion may decertify for prior termination of employment for cause (46%) or misconduct (52%). Not surprisingly, the rate of decertification among states varies considerably. Some states decertify thousands of officers annually, while others take such action at a far lower rate.

States also differ on other crucial elements, such as the amount of time after which a decertified officer may reapply to become a sworn officer, the composition of hearing panels, and the consequences of resigning during a pending investigation. Moreover, some states allow any member of the public to file a complaint and trigger a decertification investigation, while others only begin the process when a law enforcement agency notifies the decertification entity that an officer is under review. The result of this hodgepodge of decertification regimes is self-evident: some share of bad actors will resurface and resume their bad behavior. Officers who are rehired following police department separation are more likely than others to commit serious acts of misconduct. If their severance was for excessive force, research suggests they are more likely to use force again. Not only are these rehired officers likely to cause harm to community members, but they may also engender misconduct within their new peer networks. A National Decertification Index currently exists, but participation across states and law enforcement agencies is uneven. Federal leadership is required. Consistent with the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act (H.R. 1280), which passed in the U.S. House of Representatives on March 4, 2021, a national, federally-funded, and publicly accessible police misconduct registry should be established and should list officer misconduct investigations and their dispositions. Agencies should be encouraged to contribute records through a combination of federal funding incentives and mandatory state reporting laws. Decertification criteria should extend beyond criminal activity to include other types of misconduct, including sustained findings of excessive force, making false statements in a legal proceeding, falsification of evidence, acts of sexual misconduct, and domestic violence and abuse. In some states, the establishment of a public registry will require lawmakers to rescind existing laws that prohibit disclosure of disciplinary findings. Other decertification changes that states should make include:

• ensuring local agency compliance with reporting requirements;
• requiring agencies to consult state and national police misconduct registries during hiring decisions;
• closing the resignation loophole, which allows officers to avoid decertification when they resign in lieu of dismissal while an investigation is pending;
• creating a presumption of decertification and prohibiting officers from law enforcement employment during the appeals process; and
• enabling members of the public to submit a complaint to the state board independent of the local law enforcement agency, which should automatically trigger an investigation.

Far too many law enforcement agencies feature an organizational culture that discourages officers from speaking up when they see colleagues engage in inappropriate or illegal behavior. This “blue code of silence” is bred by cultures that engender a “them against us” perspective, and it may be exacerbated by the feeling among some officers that police are at extreme risk of harm and must stand together no matter what. The paramilitary structure and rigid hierarchy of police agencies further deter officers from calling out misconduct, particularly on the part of superiors. These dynamics lead to harms that could have been avoided and enable officers to engage in misconduct that goes undocumented with impunity. To help remedy this long-standing problem, agencies should adopt policies that require officers to intervene upon witnessing excessive force committed by peers and supervisors and that hold accountable those who engage in such misconduct. The Task Force also recommends requiring officers to report other forms of misconduct on the part of their peers under mandatory reporting policies. While reducing excessive use of force is a key goal, mandatory reporting policies should apply to a wide array of other police behavior, including drinking on the job and other misconduct that could lead to future problems and may merit intervention. Research shows that to be effective, mandatory intervention and reporting requirements – and the consequences for violating them – must be clearly articulated, widely disseminated, and faithfully enforced, and that whistleblowers must be protected. In addition, agencies should reinforce such policies by creating a departmental culture that is fair and equitable; research shows that officers are more likely to report wrongdoing on the part of their peers if they believe their department’s managerial practices are fair and just.

Such policies also should be reinforced through training to address negative stereotypes, racial biases, and power dynamics that help justify inaction on the part of bystanding officers. One training model designed to enforce compliance of duty-to-intervene policies, known as Active Bystandership for Law Enforcement (ABLE), is based on a program implemented by the New Orleans Police Department as part of compliance with its federal consent decree. While such programs are promising, evaluation of their impact on outcomes such as misuse of force, police misconduct, racially disparate policing, and officer safety is needed. Intervention also is more likely when it is encouraged and modeled by supervisors and peers. As such, publicly rewarding officers for intervening can prompt other officers to do so. In addition, recruiting and retaining a diverse pool of officers who are well positioned to take a guardian, rather than a warrior, approach to the job may further strengthen compliance with duty-to-intervene and mandatory reporting requirements. Equipping officers with body-worn cameras could hold more officers accountable for intervening, particularly if supervisor use of video footage for coaching and remedial purposes is a routine practice.

Neighborhoods that suffer trauma from community violence can also experience disproportionate use of force by police. This trauma is particularly acute in Black and Brown communities and has roots in policing’s complicity in enforcing slavery and Jim Crow laws. That painful legacy, coupled with the persistence of racially-biased policing practices, spawns distrust between residents and officers that, if not acknowledged and addressed, perpetuates tensions and imposes barriers to collaboration on public safety. Community trauma can manifest in many forms, including mental health challenges that make residents vulnerable to revictimization. Such trauma is inextricably linked to community violence, with studies finding that exposure to violence within interpersonal relationships and social networks increases the risk of both victimization and perpetration. Officers who are not trained to recognize trauma may cause more harm when interviewing victims of crime, including families of homicide victims, especially if they opt to use force and punitive measures when encountering people experiencing mental health crises. Officers themselves are exposed to vicarious trauma that, if untreated, can compromise their ability to police effectively and equitably and increase the odds that they engage in violence. One survey conducted in an urban police department found that 60% of male officers and 46% of female officers had experienced five or more traumatic events in the past year alone, while 15% showed signs of post-traumatic stress disorder. Some research has shown that officers who are exposed to traumatic events may be more likely to engage in physical violence at home, suggesting that a trauma-informed approach to officer wellness could benefit officers, their families, and potentially community members. But departmental culture can discourage officers from seeking help, given perceptions that they will be viewed as weak, stigmatized, ridiculed, ignored by their department, or forced to face job-related consequences for disclosing mental health problems.

Promoting trauma-informed policing involves creating officer awareness and empathy of trauma in the community and encouraging officers to recognize their own exposure to trauma on the job. The approach is primarily designed to prevent officers interacting with people who are in crisis or have experienced trauma from taking actions that would re-traumatize them. Instead, officers are taught to recognize trauma, employ strategies to defuse the volatile behaviors that may accompany it and assist with referrals to community services and supports. Crisis Intervention Teams and co-responder models that train officers to identify and safely deal with people experiencing a mental health crisis have their roots in trauma-informed practice. Given that roughly one in four people killed by police have mental health conditions, programs that train officers how to effectively respond to people in crisis offer significant potential to save lives. Trauma-informed policing also applies principles of de-escalation and procedural justice, and is complemented by strategies to increase cultural understanding between officers and the communities they serve. Such strategies include community-based listening sessions and reconciliation processes, which create opportunities for police to acknowledge and address law enforcement’s past harms, especially to Black people and other marginalized populations (e.g., the LGBTQIA community). This approach involves excavating the history of abusive policing practices toward people of color and examining more recent examples of biased criminal justice practices. One dimension involves recognition by police that some residents may hold their own implicit biases about officers based upon this history. Trauma-informed policing can build trust by connecting officers with community members and enhancing law enforcement’s awareness of their lived experience and needs. Despite their promise and logical appeal, trauma-informed policing models have not been rigorously evaluated. While research has documented the ability of reconciliation processes to mend deep-seated wounds inflicted by members of dominant groups on subjugated populations, no studies have identified the degree to which they may reduce disparate policing practices. Strategies that combine principles of trauma-informed policing, mental health awareness, de-escalation, procedural justice, officer wellness, and early intervention systems should be developed and rigorously tested in the field.