December 2024
First Step Act
An Early Analysis of Recidivism
Analysis by Avinash Bhati, PhD
Passed in 2018, the First Step Act (FSA) was designed to reduce reoffending among people leaving federal prisons. Provisions of the FSA are summarized in a Congressional Research Service brief.
According to data published by the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), 44,673 people were released from BOP facilities under the FSA from 2020 to January 2024.1
This analysis estimates recidivism rates among individuals released from BOP prior to the FSA who had similar risk profiles and were tracked for similar periods of time as those released under the FSA. Without access to data on individuals, researchers made several plausible assumptions in order to produce estimates using aggregate data that has been made public by the BOP and Office of the Attorney General (OAG). Those assumptions are explained in a supplemental methodology report. The analysis does not seek to evaluate the FSA, its programs, or its implementation.
Recidivism Rates
Recidivism rates were 55% lower for people released under the FSA.
The BOP defines recidivism as any rearrest or return to federal prison for a new crime or technical violation of supervision, regardless of the outcome of that arrest (whether a person is charged or convicted). According to the BOP's published data, the recidivism rate for all people released under the FSA is 9.7%.2 While that is considerably lower than the 44.8% recidivism rate3 for all people released from BOP facilities in 2019, people released under the FSA differ in important ways from all persons released from federal prisons; the differences include their assessed risk level and the length of time they have been out of prison. To account for these differences, this analysis estimates recidivism among people released prior to the implementation of the FSA who are similar to people released under the FSA in two key ways: (1) they had a similar risk assessment classification according to BOP’s current risk assessment tool, and (2) they had been released to the community for a similar amount of time.
The analysis shows that people released prior to the FSA who were at similar risk of reoffending and had similar amounts of time in the community had an estimated recidivism rate of 21.5%. This means the recidivism rate for people released under the FSA is roughly 55% lower than similarly situated people released prior to the FSA.4 The analysis also found lower rates of recidivism among people released under the FSA within each of the four risk levels as assessed by BOP's risk assessment tool.
In December 2023, CCJ released a supplemental analysis, Technically Speaking: Accounting for Technical Violations in First Step Act Recidivism, which provided additional context for people released under the FSA by distinguishing recidivism due to technical violations of supervision rules from cases involving new criminal activity. Although data limitations prevented the update of this report for 2023 FSA releases, roughly a third (31%) of recidivism among people released under the FSA through 2022 was due to technical violations. A similar proportion of recidivism should provide an upper bound for the number of technical violations for the full sample of releases through 2023. This is due to the longer follow-up period, the fact that many of the early FSA releases are likely no longer under supervision, and the changing risk profiles of FSA releases over time.
Arrests Incurred
People released under the FSA incurred 4,837 fewer arrests.
Drawing on the recidivism analysis above, it is possible to estimate the total number of arrests (for new crime or technical violations) incurred by people released under the FSA and by 44,673 similarly situated people (i.e., risk level and time since release from prison) released from federal prisons prior to the FSA. With a recidivism rate of 9.7%, the 44,673 people released under the FSA over four years could have accounted for between 5,651 and 7,097 arrests in the community over four years. With an estimated recidivism rate of 21.5%, an equal number of similarly situated people released prior to the FSA could have accounted for between 9,589 and 11,934 arrests in the community over four years. Taken together, these estimates suggest that people released under the FSA could have accounted for between 3,938 and 4,837 fewer arrests in the community over four years when compared to similarly situated people who were released from federal prisons prior to the FSA.
National Arrests
People released under the FSA accounted for 0.03% of national arrests.
While the number of arrests in the U. S. varies over time, from 2020 to 2023, there were approximately 26.4 million arrests made nationally.5 The highest estimated number of arrests incurred by people released under the FSA over four years (7,097) would account for about three one-hundredths of one percent (0.027%) of all arrests nationwide during that time period, or 27 out of every 100,000 arrests. The highest estimated number of incurred arrests for similarly situated people (i.e., risk level and time since release from prison) released from federal prisons prior to the FSA over four years would account for 0.045% of all arrests, or 45 out of every 100,000.
0.03%
Conclusions, Limitations, and Next Steps
The analysis suggests that people released under the FSA have lower recidivism rates than rates estimated for similarly situated people (i.e., risk level and time since release from prison) released from federal prisons prior to the act's implementation. The analysis does not imply that this reduction was caused by the FSA alone. While there is no clear, causal explanation for this reduction, several factors, individually or collectively, may have led to lower recidivism among people released under the FSA.
Roughly 54% of the individuals released under the FSA completed at least one evidence-based recidivism reduction program. It is possible that these programs successfully reduced recidivism among participants. It is also possible that people with the most motivation for post-release success were more likely to complete these programs and therefore may have had lower rates of recidivism regardless of program participation. However, the BOP acknowledges that implementation of the programs was slowed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and other factors. Therefore, it is unlikely that the direct causal impact of FSA programming would be this large (i.e., a 55% reduction).
People released under the FSA were released from federal prisons at varying times from 2020 to 2023 and were tracked for recidivism after their release. The individuals released prior to the FSA who were included in this analysis were all released from prison in 2019 and tracked for recidivism from 2020 to 2022. The different coverage periods for members of the two groups may influence the observed and estimated recidivism rates. In particular, disruptions in police, court, and corrections operations caused by the pandemic may explain some of the differences in recidivism rates.
The analysis above used the BOP’s risk assessment tool to identify individuals with similar risk profiles who were released prior to the FSA. It is very possible that, even within each risk level, people released under the FSA are different in important ways from those released prior to the FSA. This means the two groups may differ in ways not accounted for by risk level alone, which may explain the difference in recidivism rates.
A more comprehensive comparison between people released under the FSA and those released under other mechanisms is necessary to properly evaluate the impact of the FSA on recidivism and crime. Detailed individual-level data about the people released and under which mechanism they were released, whether they participated in evidence-based recidivism reduction programs or productive activities during custody, the type of recidivism (violent, property, drug, other offense, or technical supervision violation), and how good time and earned time sentence credits impacted the length of their prison term is needed to inform such a comparison.
While this analysis attempts to construct a more valid comparison of people released under the FSA and people released from the BOP prior to the FSA, its findings should not be interpreted as an impact assessment of the FSA. Undertaking a well-designed, individual-level study is an important next step in evaluating the impact of the legislation.